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Ernest is burning midnight oil over your next Presidential Briefing on Energy, he will have to have someone physically in his office.

6. The members of the APEX Steering Group oppose a generalized "two person" rule and have been forceful in their opposition--except for the CIA-oriented members who believe, as I do, that you demand it. I have, to date, simply overridden their objections. Conscience demands that I make sure that I understand your position before printing 20,000 copies.

7. The argumentation is simple--the "two person" rule is too simplistic. It makes no sense to say that you cannot be alone in your office, and not much more to have only two persons in an industrial bay that is normally occupied by hundreds. The rule is too costly in what it will do to the Intelligence Community members in terms of overtime or, conversely, to their collective output. SIOs will, perforce, grant multitudes of exceptions--a bad thing, and we will soon lose track of the exceptions because of their volume. We should not establish rules that we can't live with, and we should enforce those that we establish.

8. The objective of the "two person" rule is to prevent pilfering or improper copying of documents. The following paragraph contains the existing language in the two Security Policy Manuals and alternative language that reduces considerably the actual scope of the "two person" rule, but keeps the objective in focus. I recommend that you approve the new language because:

- it probably can be widely enforced;
- it would not require wholesale exceptions;
- it might tend to spread the use of polygraphs (but this is a weak argument);
- it would hold down the operating and implementing costs of APEX;
- and even blind adherence to "two person" rule, as written, does not guarantee the desired protection.

9. The texts of the "two person" rule provisions of the APEX Government and Industry Manuals, and the proposed revised language for both, follow:

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Government Manual (Existing)

To provide proper security and safety protection to APEX materials, all ACFs will be staffed by at least two persons when in use. Persons selected to work in such areas will be chosen on the basis of proven reliability, maturity, and having current access to APEX. Waivers to the two-person rule may be granted by SIOs of the Intelligence Community and must be reported to the APEX Control Staff.

Industry Manual (Existing)

To provide security and safety protection to APEX materials, all CACFs will be occupied by at least two APEX indoctrinated persons when in use. Persons selected to work in such areas will be chosen on the basis of proven reliability and maturity.

Proposed Revision of "Two Person" Rule
for both Government and Industry Manual

As a matter of policy, APEX Control Facilities (ACFs) should be staffed with sufficient people to deter unauthorized copying or illegal removal of SCI material. ACF-designated communication centers, document control centers (registries), and like facilities that handle or store quantities of SCI materials must be manned, whenever they are in operation, by at least two appropriately indoctrinated persons in such proximity to one another as to provide mutual support in maintaining the integrity of the facility and the material stored therein. Courier service will be conducted by two persons. Contractors will provide two person occupancy in all CACFs not specifically excepted by the Government sponsor. Routine work by a lone individual in any ACF is to be avoided. The granting by an SIO of exceptions to this policy should involve consideration of the proven reliability and maturity of the persons involved; the volume, variety and sensitivity of the holdings in the facility; and especially whether or not the persons involved are subject to periodic polygraph examinations as a condition of access. Exceptions for communications centers, document control centers, and the like should be granted in only extraordinary circumstances.

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10. This memorandum has been coordinated with the Director of Security and the Executive Secretary/SECOM. The APEX Steering Group is not aware of it nor is the Security Committee.

11. Please indicate below your confirmation of the existing language as stated in paragraph 9, or your approval of the proposed change:

Keep existing language

Modify as proposed

Other

[Redacted box] 24 JUN 1980

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[Redacted box]

*The reports of my redundancy
are grossly exaggerated - in
fact I can't recall
exercising judgment on this*

[Redacted box]